RSD : a comment by Love, James & Stevens, James
Strathprints Institutional Repository
Love, James and Stevens, James (1988) RSD : a comment. Quarterly 
Economic Commentary, 13 (4). pp. 48-52. ISSN 2046-5378 , 
This version is available at http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/51519/
Strathprints is  designed  to  allow  users  to  access  the  research  output  of  the  University  of 
Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights 
for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You 
may  not  engage  in  further  distribution  of  the  material  for  any  profitmaking  activities  or  any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the 
content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without 
prior permission or charge. 
Any  correspondence  concerning  this  service  should  be  sent  to  Strathprints  administrator: 
strathprints@strath.ac.uk
Economic Perspective 
RSD: A COMMENT 
James Love and James Stevens 
Department of Economics, University of Strathclyde 
This quarter saw the British Steel Bill go through 
its Committee stage in the House of Commons and 
receive its Third Reading. After a discussion in 
the Lords, the bill will become law, thus allowing 
the government to privatise BSC at a time of its 
choosing. The Bill is a relatively short document 
which does not in itself privatise the Corporation 
but provides for the assets and liabilities of BSC 
to be transferred to a successor company which 
will be structured to conform with the 
requirements of the Companies Act (1985). This 
involves the reduction and extinguishing of the 
present public dividend capital to be replaced by 
ordinary shares to be wholly owned, in the first 
instance, by the Treasury. In addition, the 
capital of the Corporation is to be restructured. 
This involves a capital write-off to eliminate the 
losses evident in BSCs profit and loss account. 
There is no intention to write off debt which 
would not be possible under present ECSC 
regulations. When all assets are transferred to 
the successor company, the existing British Steel 
Corporation will be wound up. At the completion 
of this procedure, the successor company should 
possess a capital structure similar to other 
Companies Act companies. This will allow the 
government to undertake a flotation of the equity 
of the business at some appropriate point. Whilst 
it does not privatise BSC, the British Steel Bill 
clears the path for this exercise to go ahead. 
The Bill has provoked considerable controversy 
across a range of issues. Of particular interest 
to Scotland was an amendment to Clause 1 proposed 
by Dr Jeremy Bray which read: 
"Before the appointed day the Secretary of State 
shall lay before parliament a report giving 
quantitative estimates of the advantages and 
disadvantages to the Exchequer, to the 
Corporation, to the customers and employees of the 
whole and of the several parts of the Corporation 
of the disposal of the successor company and its 
subsidiaries as a single entity or as more than 
one entity". Hansard, 17 May 1988, c 803. 
Ostensibly, this asks the Department of Trade and 
Industry to consider the advantages and 
disadvantages of privatising BSC as a whole or as 
two or more independent units. In reality it asks 
the Government to contemplate the so-called 
Ravenscraig - Shotton - Dalzell (RSD) proposals 
promulgated in a study commissioned by Motherwell 
DC and undertaken by management consultants Arthur 
Young (AY). 
The first section of the report presents an 
analysis similar to that enunciated in previous 
commentaries but dealt with issues in greater 
detail than has previously been the case. The AY 
consultants demonstrate that, given widely 
accepted assumptions about the future demand for 
UK steel, it would be in the commercial interests 
of BSC to run down the existing Scottish operation 
at Ravenscraig and Dalzell over the next six or 
seven years; thus moving BSC from a 5 to a 4 
integrated plant operation. The report argues 
that this would result in annual savings of circa 
£100 m to BSC without loss of output. However, it 
is stressed that locational savings are not 
available immediately and that the continuing 
phased run down of bulk steel-making in Scotland 
can only be achieved by investment or transfer of 
assets to other sites. Given present and likely 
investment intentions the report concludes that 
the Hot Strip Mill will be superfluous in 1989, 
whilst steel making at Ravenscraig could be 
eliminated by early 1991. The Dalzell plate mill 
is in a stronger position but, as we have 
repeatedly argued, it is vulnerable to the 
strategic requirement for BSC to modernise its 
platemaking facilities. The report concludes that 
this could be resolved as early as 1993. 
In our view, this report adds weight to the 
position adopted over the past 4 years in this 
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Commentary which sought to demonstrate that BSC 
was engaged in a phased withdrawal from bulk 
steelmaking in Scotland. 
We restated our conclusions in November 1987 thus: 
"Because BSC's heavy end is large relative to the 
rolling capacity grouped round it, the attractions 
of consolidating on four sites are evident. 
Given scarce investment capital it is only in 
relatively disastrous states of the world that 
any abrupt move would make sense. However, a long 
term strategy designed to achieve this is 
available to the Corporation and the Scottish 
Lobby must guard against this." (Fraser of 
Allander Institute, Quarterly Economic Commentary, 
November 1987, p37). 
The contribution of the AY consultants is to 
specify exactly how the final stages of the run-
down can be achieved and to provide estimates of 
the locational savings inherent in this exercise. 
This study was carried out by personnel who were, 
in the main, all former BSC employees and who do 
not lack experience or expertise about the UK 
steel industry. 
The AY consultants did not receive the co-
operation of either BSC or the DTI and their 
analysis can thus be viewed as that of 
"outsiders". However no serious response to these 
conclusions has been advanced other than to fall 
back on the "guarantees" on strip, steel and plate 
production outlined by Mr Kenneth Clarke in his 
statement of 3rd December 1987. As is widely 
known these "guarantees" are subject to market 
conditions" which even according to Scottish 
Secretary, Mr Malcolm Rifkind, means that they are 
"not fully bankable". 
Our view on this was set out in the previous 
Commentary. 
"It appears that otherwise serious government 
ministers rest content on a promise by BSC to 
sustain the Scottish Steel industry if the 
business as a whole is making commercial rates of 
return. This logic compels one to enquire why 
government spokesmen don't stand up every day in 
the House of Commons and guarantee everyone's job 
on that basis. Stripped of pseudo economic 
jargon, the main element of the bargain states 
that if you can sell your output at acceptable 
levels of profit then your job will be safe. This 
is little different from the situation facing most 
workers and enterprises in the traded goods 
sector. . . . In actual fact. . . these 
guarantees . . . are not really guarantees but 
signals to the financial institutions of the room 
to manoeuvre provided by the current location of 
plant within the Corporation . . . Given expected 
returns and investment programmes a reduction to 4 
or fewer sites can only take place over a 
relatively long time period. The 7 year guarantee 
on steel and platemaking sets out the timescales 
of locational change and signals this constraint 
to potential future owners. Naturally, in 
exceptionally good future scenarios further 
investment and continued operation can be 
justified although no-one in the Corporation 
believes in this eventuality. If the trading 
environment remains favourable, as at present, 
then after 7 years the Corporation would be able, 
through its investment programme, to rationalise 
at fewer locations without serious curtailment to 
the product range. If market conditions 
deteriorate then the private sector company has 
the facility to make locational savings as part of 
a more intense and dramatic upheaval. Thus the 
rules of the game post-privatisation are clearly 
set out and valuation can proceed on this basis. 
However, the Motherwell workforce have been 
guaranteed little over and above what would happen 
in any event." (FAI, Quarterly Economic 
Commentary, March 1988, pp 28-29). 
Thus, the guarantees form a necessary backdrop 
against which valuation can take place. The 
capital re-organisation is the second vital 
ingredient. As yet we do not know the proposed 
capital structure, but a clear picture emerges of 
a privatised BSC being able to increase its return 
on capital employed and its equity value 
substantially in the medium term through further 
rationalisation. BSC suggest that there is a 
"commercial requirement" for Ravenscraig slab and 
Dalzell plate for a further 7 years. The AY 
report concludes that the elimination of this 
capacity could be undertaken more quickly. 
Whichever view is accepted, it adds up to the end 
of bulk-steelmaking in Scotland by the mid 1990s 
with no loss of output or market share to BSC. 
This is the "doom and gloom scenario" which 
everyone except Government Ministers regard as the 
most probable outcome. 
In order to avert this likelihood, the AY report 
proposed the so-called RSD option which calls for 
the Ravenscraig steelmaking and hot strip mill, 
the Dalzell plate mill and Shotton CR mill and 
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coatings complex to be privatised separately from 
the rest of BSC's capacity. This proposal was not 
well received. It cut across the conclusions of 
the 1986 NEDO study, which suggests that: 
"the unity and dominance of BSC has been a 
significant factor in the successful restoration 
of the UK steel industry's overall performance. It 
is suggested that any steps to split up BSC's 
overall corporate and management unity should not 
be taken lightly. . .severing of BSC links to user 
markets through complete hiving-off of the joint 
ownership companies or further arbitrary complete 
corporate divorce of the remaining BSC operations 
by region or product group could weaken the UK 
steel industry's overall stance against principal 
overseas competitors who are strengthening their 
own links between steel production and the 
market." (NEDO: The world market and the UK steel 
industry, July 1986, pp 11-12). 
The purpose of citing these views is to illustrate 
a set of propositions which those inside the 
industry and within Whitehall regard as axiomatic. 
This is the conventional wisdom accepted and 
promoted by steel executives, politicians, civil 
servants, trade union leaders and shop stewards. 
The RSD proposal explicitly denies this and as 
such was always destined to meet with a cool 
response in many circles. 
In the Parliamentary debates the RSD option was 
promoted as a measure which would constrain the 
market power of a privatised monopoly whilst 
affording the possibility of further efficiency 
gains through increased competition between two UK 
bulk steelmakers. This is a fairly weak line of 
attack. First there is little to suggest that 
likely product market conditions will foster any 
inefficiencies in any aspect of corporate 
activity. The competitive pressure on UK steel 
from other producers and other materials is set to 
become more exacting in the 1990s. Since there 
would be little direct, nose to nose, competition 
between BSC and RSD, it is difficult to argue that 
the creation of two separate entities would 
contribute significantly to the considerable 
existing pressure for top performance. Secondly, 
the home market for BSC should be properly 
regarded as European market, where the Corporation 
will be one of the larger producers but with a 
small share of the total market. 
The issue of dynamic efficiency was raised by Dr 
Bray (Hansard, 17 May 1988, c 804-806). He views 
the emergence of a second bulk steelmaker as 
necessary to provide a "strong incentive to 
develop new materials and processes which would 
help it be technologically competitive". Dr Bray 
is perfectly correct to suggest that BSC has 
little incentive to develop and adopt new 
technologies such as direct smelting and thin slab 
casting which threaten to significantly lower the 
minimum efficient plant size for strip production. 
The dominant locational pressure on BSC is one of 
reducing sites because BSC perceives that it has 
adequate steelmaking capacity at 4 or less plants 
to service its preferred configuration of mills. 
Thus there is little perceived need to embrace 
technological innovations which hold out the 
prospects of a new generation of mini-mills 
competing with BOF plants over products which are 
traditionally the preserve of the large bulk steel 
makers. BSC has little medium term need to 
contemplate the locational upheavals implied by 
these developments which promise to revolutionise 
the industrial structure of both steel and steel 
using sectors. Thus Dr Bray may well be correct 
in suggesting that BSC has "no serious expectation 
that its modest investment in research into new 
processes will lead to fresh investment". 
As he noted in Committee, BSC "has been selling 
off all the higher technology sectors and has 
deliberately run down its research and development 
so that it does not have the high technology 
prospects that might attract investors. We would 
thus be running the last generation of technology 
into the ground while refusing to develop the new 
technology of the slab casting with all the energy 
savings and improved metallurgical properties that 
it provides". (Official Report of Standing 
Committee D, British Steel Bill, C439 and 442). A 
very clear case of "caveat emptor"! 
However, given the international mobility of steel 
technology it is a moot point whether this is 
necessarily bad for UK steel production as opposed 
to the various interests associated with BSC. 
Clearly there is a possibility that BSC's market 
will be attacked by minimills and that BSC could 
suffer. This technology is likely to be cheap, 
affording competitors opportunities to encroach on 
BSC's markets, and may present no great threat to 
the UK if there are no barriers to entry into the 
UK and European markets for new capacity. The 
true costs are those emanating from the failure to 
develop a leading role in the development of this 
technology. It is difficult to quantify these as 
they are highly uncertain, wide-ranging and long-
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running in nature. Unfortunately there is little 
evidence of any appreciation of this on behalf of 
the present administration. They appear to see no 
problem and no strategic issues to address through 
RSD or otherwise. However, like Dr Bray, we are 
concerned about a future in which "Britain can 
merely tag along behind, licensing new products 
and processes across the board". It is not the 
case that RSD would necessarily be the best 
solution to this given its projected size. 
Perhaps a better outcome would be for central 
government to finance the development of this 
technology as part of its industrial policy and 
encourage adoption. 
Thus the competition aspects of privatising BSC as 
a single unit do not add up to a convincing case 
for RSD. The second problem with RSD is its 
explicit "profit penalty to the two groups 
reaching a peak of £100 m per annum" (AY Report pp 
18). In valuations terms the whole is likely to 
be greater than the sum of its parts which is not 
a compelling argument with which to approach the 
Treasury. This is especially true when the 
compensating benefits of competition are difficult 
to establish. The third problem relates to the 
financing of RSD. The new group would require 
substantial capital investment in its plate mill 
and coke ovens on top of the purchase price. In 
any event without the clear blessing of government 
and BSC no investors are going to commit 
themselves to this venture. Thus RSD lacked up-
front support from either capital markets or 
possible partners. 
It is our view that RSD rests weakly upon certain 
economic arguments advanced in its favour. The 
government back bencher, Mr Michael Fallon was 
totally correct to suggest that the "new clause is 
a Ravenscraig protection clause". However, Mr 
Fallon and his front bench team are guilty of 
misrepresenting the nature of this protection. 
The opposition were not implicitly arguing that 
"we want to protect Ravenscraig for ever or we 
want to protect it for 20 years, 40 years or 60 
years." There is a clear argument which suggests 
that under the auspices of Sir Robert Scholey and 
the BSC corporate planners, Ravenscraig has no 
chance of survival. It is not in the interest of 
BSC to produce on this site after the early 1990s. 
This will not be market outcome but the conclusion 
of planners and executives given market 
conditions. The market may determine the size of 
BSC but Corporation officials will determine the 
structure and location of the business. The RSD 
option was an attempt to allow the market to 
determine the fate of Scottish steelmaking. If RSD 
could market its output it would survive and 
flourish and any capacity reductions would be felt 
elsewhere. RSD was an attempt to remove 
Ravenscraig from BSC's internal dynamic which is 
loaded against it and Mr Fallon et a! should have 
been more open to arguments which simply sought to 
allow RSD to take a market test. Another red 
herring introduced by the Government side, and, 
inter alia, by Mr Fallon was to argue that "if 
Ravenscraig is fully competitive" then "there will 
be no question of Ravenscraig being closed". It 
is clearly and demonstrably profitable for BSC to 
produce at 5 sites. However, it is relatively 
more profitable to produce at 4. The marginal 
plant may be technically efficient and capable of 
being highly profitable, if suitably loaded and 
continually upgraded and modernised. It is not in 
BSC's interests to do this in the medium term. 
Again a fairer solution would be to allow RSD to 
compete for markets with BSC and other 
steelmakers. 
Thus Mr Fallon and the government front bench 
explicitly endorsed a corporate structure 
unfavourable to Scottish interests. They were 
joined in this by the majority of the Labour 
opposition. The former seemed more concerned with 
the effect of RSD on the revenue available from 
flotation whilst the latter seemed more pre-
occupied with the potentially adverse implications 
for capacity at the 4 English and Welsh sites. As 
Mr Clarke noted, RSO had few friends outside 
Motherwell and given that the proposal was indeed 
"a political structure for part of the industry" 
it failed to attract significant political 
support. Thus Dr Bray's modest amendment when 
forced to the vote was deserted by both main 
parties and the RSD episode is effectively closed. 
BSC will be privatised as a single unit with the 
likely consequences of phased withdrawal from 
Motherwell over the next 5 - 7 years. 
This outcome was predictable and known to those 
involved in constructing and advocating the RSD 
option. In our view it was a clever but ill-
conceived attempt to protect the position of the 
Hot Strip Mill which is the most immediately 
vulnerable to contractionary pressures given the 
new con cast facilities at Llanwern. It would 
appear that the game is up for Scottish strip 
making although there is much to play for in the 
Plates division where future investment intentions 
are less certain and programmes less advanced. 
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It is clear that BSC executives regard one 
platemill as optimal although Scottish Industry 
Minister, Mr Ian Lang, insists that no firm plans 
exist because any development "must have 
Government approval and BSC have not approached 
the government". It is not difficult to take 
issue with this reasoning by recalling that the 
stated aim of privatisation is to obviate the 
requirement for BSC to seek Government permission 
for this or any other decision and by noting that 
privatisation is imminent. Whatever the 
discussion and views currently advanced within the 
Corporation, two things are evident. Firstly, 
unless pressed hard by prospective buyers or 
sellers, BSC seem intent on saying as little as 
possible about how they intend to resolve their 
medium term production arrangements in this 
sector. Secondly, given competing claims and the 
necessity to generate investment capital either 
internally or from market sources, it is not clear 
how soon BSC will be in a position to undertake 
major projects such as a unified platemaking 
facility. It will be of considerable interest to 
hear how BSC management react to the mounting 
clamour for £60 million expenditure in cooling 
facilities at Dalzell, given that concentration of 
all production at one mill is a preferred but more 
costly exercise. If the corporate intention is to 
clear the way for a retreat from Motherwell then 
any modernisation sanctioned may be minimal 
although it should be recognised that a 
considerably upgraded Scottish platemill could 
exist as an exposed island site, supplied by 
Lackenby until funds emerge to finance a more 
satisfactory long run solution. 
Thus it is clear that Scottish interests should 
now recognise that securing plate mill investment 
is the best opportunity for maintaining bulk steel 
making in Scotland. Following privatisation this 
will be easier said than done. As Dr Bray 
remarked "those decisions will be flushed out into 
the open soon after the Secretary of State has 
lost his powers and possibly while he still owns 
the shares. Is that a satisfactory position for 
the government"? It has the merit that it frees 
Industry and Scottish Office Ministers of the task 
of announcing more "superb news" for Scottish 
steel. 
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